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Apart from being one of the major causes of mortality and morbidity, cancer also has
important economic consequences because cancer patients often reduce their labor supply.
Medical innovations in cancer treatment are primarily designed to lower mortality, but they
may also have the benefit of helping cancer patients maintain their precancer labor market
activities. Hence, when assessing the costs and benefits of new medical treatments, it is
important to take into consideration not just whether the new treatment can extend the lives
of cancer patients but also whether it can help patients successfully participate in the labor
market and maintain their productivity. Policymakers may be concerned that not all patients
benefit from medical innovation equally and that the economic gains from medical innovation
may differ by socioeconomic status.
In this study, we address two important questions related to medical innovation in cancer
treatment. First, our study provides the first evidence on how medical innovation in cancer
treatment affects the labor market outcomes of breast and prostate cancer patients. Second,
we assess differences in labor market benefits of medical innovation by patients’ level of
education to determine whether economic gains related to medical innovation differ by
socioeconomic status. To estimate the effect of medical innovation, we use unique Canadian
administrative data from several sources. Our findings imply substantial gains from medical
innovation in terms of smaller declines in employment following a cancer diagnosis. These
gains are observed almost exclusively among individuals with postsecondary education.
Cancer research has grown rapidly in recent decades (Sudhakar 2009), leading to a 23
percent decline in cancer-related death rates in the United States between 1991 and 2016
(Siegel, Miller, and Jemal 2016). Lichtenberg (2013; 2014; 2015; 2017; 2018a; 2018b) provides
U.S., Canadian, and international evidence directly tying a decline in cancer mortality to
an increase in available drugs and cancer research more broadly. This decline in mortality
comes at a cost. The median cost of developing a new cancer drug is $800 million U.S.
dollars (Prasad and Mailankody 2017). Between 2005 and 2012, total public expenditures on
chemotherapy and radiation therapy in Canada increased by factors of 3 and 3.5, respectively,
in real terms (de Oliveira et al. 2018). There has been no evidence on the economic benefits
of this costly innovation in cancer treatment, such as the effects of new cancer treatments
on changes in labor market participation of cancer patients. This paper fills this gap and
thereby contributes to our understanding of the cost-effectiveness of new treatments.
We focus on prostate and breast cancer for three reasons. First, they are the most common
cancer diagnoses among men and women. Second, survival rates are high compared to other
cancer types, so breast and prostate cancer patients are more likely to benefit from improved
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treatment options in terms of their labor market outcomes. Third, while cancer usually occurs
later in life, a relatively large fraction of prostate and breast cancer diagnoses occur during
working age. Hence, we expect meaningful changes in labor market outcomes in response to
improved treatment. Bradley et al. (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2007; 2013) analyze the
labor market outcomes of breast and prostate cancer patients, but to our knowledge no study
has considered the role of treatment innovation in this context or in the context of any other
cancer types. We provide more background on breast and prostate cancer in Section 3.1.
To study the labor market effects of innovation in cancer treatment, we use data linking
the Canadian 1991 Census cohort with the Canadian Cancer Registry and individual income
tax returns. These data provide a representative sample of individuals diagnosed with breast
and prostate cancer in Canada between 1992 and 2010 (see Section 4). We track the labor
market outcomes (employment status and annual earnings) of these cancer patients before
and after their diagnosis and identify a control group consisting of individuals who were never
diagnosed with cancer. We capture the cumulative level of medical innovation related to the
treatment of breast and prostate cancer by counting the number of drugs that were approved
for the treatment of these cancers and by constructing a quality-weighted patent index (see
Section 3.2). To our knowledge, no study has used patent data to estimate the effect of
medical innovation on labor market outcomes or any other economic or health outcomes.
Using data from the treatment group (cancer patients) before and after the diagnosis
and from the control group, we employ difference-in-differences regressions to estimate the
impact of cancer diagnosis on labor market outcomes and the degree to which this effect is
moderated by medical innovation. To study how the impact of innovation varies by education,
we estimate separate regressions for patients with different levels of highest educational
attainment: primary, secondary, and postsecondary education. In all regressions, we use
coarsened exact matching weights to balance treatment and control group based on observed
variables, including pre-treatment labor market outcomes. Section 5 presents a detailed
description of our empirical strategy.
Our results confirm the existing evidence of negative labor market effects of breast and
prostate cancer diagnoses. More important, we find that medical innovation, measured by the
number of approved drugs and patents, reduced the negative employment effect of prostate
cancer by about 64 percent to 70 percent over our study period. For breast cancer, medical
innovation mitigated the negative effect on employment by 63–68 percent, and this effect was
concentrated among women aged 35–44 whose breast cancer diagnoses are typically more
severe than the diagnoses of older women. We find marginally statistically significant effects
of medical innovation at the intensive labor supply margin. When estimating separate effects
by education, we find that the economic gains of medical innovation arise almost exclusively
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among patients with postsecondary education. This result raises concerns about unequal
access to medical innovation. We present a comprehensive discussion of our empirical findings
in Section 6.
This study contributes to several distinct literatures. First, and most important, we
contribute to the small but growing literature on the labor market effects of medical innovation,
which focuses on pharmaceutical innovation such as the birth control pill (Goldin and Katz
2002; Bailey 2006), painkillers (Garthwaite 2012; Bütikofer and Skira 2018), HIV treatment
(Papageorge 2016; Thirumurthy, Graff Zivin, and Goldstein 2008), and hormone replacement
therapy (Daysal and Orsini 2014), as well as minimally invasive surgery (Epstein et al.
2013). These studies use the introduction of a specific new medical technology as a natural
experiment. In contrast, we do not focus on one particular innovation but take a broader view
on medical innovation and consider the labor market effects of cumulative medical innovation
in cancer treatment over two decades.
We also shed light on the value of medical innovation more generally. Cutler and McClellan
(2001) show that increased medical spending is cost-effective in many cases. Murphy and
Topel (2003) develop a general framework to evaluate the gains from medical innovations
and find that the economic benefits of reducing mortality are very large. We contribute to
this literature by considering the individual benefits that arise from medical innovation when
cancer patients are able to stay economically more active after a diagnosis.
Our results also relate to the large literature on labor market effects of health (see Currie
and Madrian 1999 for a summary). Garcia Gomez et al. (2013) and Dobkin et al. (2018)
have documented the negative employment and earnings effects of hospitalizations. Jeon
(2017) studies the labor market effects of cancer diagnoses using the same data sources as the
present paper.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the nexus among health, education, and
economic outcomes. For example, Lundborg, Nilsson, and Vikström (2015) and Parro and
Pohl (2018) show that the labor market effects of health shocks differ by education in Sweden
and Chile. Heinesen and Kolodziejczyk (2013) find larger negative employment effects among
less educated breast and colorectal cancer patients in Denmark. Glied and Lleras-Muney
(2008) find that declines in mortality due to health-related technological progress are largest
among highly educated individuals, and Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg (2005) show that
patients with more education are more likely to use recently launched drugs. We add to this
literature by studying how the interaction between medical innovation and education affects
cancer patients’ labor market outcomes.
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2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we provide a theoretical framework motivating the links among medical
innovation, education, and labor market outcomes of cancer patients that we investigate in
the empirical portion of this study. First, we consider the effect of improved treatments on
labor market outcomes; second, we incorporate education into the framework.
In the Grossman (1972) model, health capital Ht evolves over an individual’s life according
to
Ht = H((1− γt)Ht−1, THt ,Mt),
where γt is the period-specific depreciation rate, THt is time spent on investing in health, and
Mt denotes market health inputs such as surgeries and pharmaceuticals. Here, it is useful
to interpret Mt in terms of quantity and quality of health care. That is, a higher value of
Mt could reflect more treatment but also better and more effective treatment options. The
individual’s health status affects her labor supply through a time constraint, given by
TWt + TZt + THt + T St = Θ,
where TWt is time spent working, TZt is time spent on household production, T St is unproductive
sick time, and Θ is the total available time per period.
A negative health shock such as a cancer diagnosis (captured by a temporary increase in
the depreciation rate γt) raises sick time T St . At the same time, it is likely that the individual
decides to increase her health investment time THt to offset at least a portion of the decline
in her health capital. Therefore, she has less time available for market and home production,
TWt + TZt , and likely reduces both.1
In this model, medical innovation leads to an increase in the quality of health care Mt,
so conditional on γt, Ht−1, and THt , the individual’s health capital Ht is higher than in the
absence of medical innovation. It is possible that the individual lowers her time input into
health investment in response to a higher Mt, but it is more likely that Mt cannot be easily
substituted for THt , particularly in the case of cancer treatment such as chemotherapy. As
medical innovation reduces the decline in health capital, the effect of a health shock on TWt
is also smaller. Thus, in this model, medical innovation leads to a smaller decrease in labor
supply caused by a cancer diagnosis.
1In a market-based health care system, a sick individual may not reduce her labor supply or may reduce
it less in order to afford medical care. In Canada, however, a cancer patient faces almost no out-of-pocket
spending for her treatment, so labor supply is not driven by this mechanism. Although self-administered
prescription drugs are not covered by the public health care system, drugs that are administered by a medical
provider, including chemotherapy drugs for cancer treatment, are covered.
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Education (or, more generally, human capital) has two main effects in the Grossman
(1972) model. First, it raises the efficiency of the production of health— that is, ∂Ht/∂Mt
increases in education. This higher efficiency may arise from a better capacity to process
information in order to seek out high-quality medical providers or innovative treatments.
Education may also improve adherence to treatment. Second, it increases the wage or the
marginal benefit of time spent working, TWt . Both of these effects imply that, following a
cancer diagnosis, more educated individuals reduce their labor supply by a smaller amount
because they produce more health with the same amount of medical care and because the loss
of earnings resulting from a decline in labor supply is higher. When a novel treatment option
becomes available, highly educated cancer patients are better able to take advantage of the
new treatment as they are more efficient producers of health than less educated patients.
Hence, highly educated patients can mitigate the negative labor market impact of cancer to
a greater degree than less educated patients.
3 Cancer and Measuring Innovation in Cancer Treat-
ment
This section provides background information about the incidence, diagnosis, and treatment
of prostate and breast cancer. We summarize innovation in the treatment of these diseases
and describe the innovation measures used in the empirical analyses below.
3.1 Prostate and Breast Cancer
Prostate and breast cancer are the most common cancer diagnoses among men and women.
In 2017, 21,300 men in Canada were diagnosed with prostate cancer (21 percent of all cancer
diagnoses in the country) and 26,300 women were diagnosed with breast cancer (25 percent
of all cancer diagnoses in the country). In the same year, 4,100 men and 4,900 women in
Canada died from prostate and breast cancer. The survival rates for these two types of cancer
are relatively high compared to other types of cancer, with a 95 percent five-year survival
rate for prostate cancer and a 87 percent rate for breast cancer.2 Although patients with
localized breast and prostate cancers have relatively good prospects for successful treatment,
cancers that have already metastasized lead to much higher death rates (Bubendorf et al.




Prostate cancer is very uncommon in men under the age of 50 and occurs most often
among those aged over 65; however, 40 percent of prostate cancer cases occur before age
65.3 As we are interested in the labor market effects of cancer and medical innovation, we
restrict the sample to men aged 49–60 at the time of the diagnosis. That is, considering a
five-year follow-up period, these men are below typical retirement age. Breast cancer is also
more common in older women: 16 percent of breast cancer cases occur before age 50 and
4 percent before age 40.4 Breast cancer tends to be more aggressive in younger women. In
our empirical analyses, we include women aged 35–60. As most of the recent innovations in
breast cancer relate to more severe types of the disease (see the following section), we focus
our main analyses on a sample of younger women, aged 35–44.
Routine screenings are available for prostate and breast cancer. For breast cancer, the
current Canadian guidelines do not recommend routine screening for women under the age of
49 but do recommend regular mammography every two to three years for women aged 50–69.
This recommendation was largely unchanged throughout our sample period, from 1992 to
2010 (Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination 1994, Chapter 65; Canadian
Task Force on Preventive Health Care 2011). For women aged 35–44, who constitute the
focus of our analysis, no breast cancer screening was recommended throughout our sample
period. We can therefore attribute any impact on labor market outcomes of young breast
cancer patients to changes in technology and not in screening recommendations.
For prostate cancer, the guidelines recommend neither the inclusion nor exclusion of the
digital rectal exam in/from periodic health examinations for men aged 50–70. Due to the high
false positive rate, the guidelines do not recommend routine prostate-specific antigen tests for
men of any age. These recommendations remained unchanged throughout our sample period
(Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination 1994, Chapter 67; Canadian Task
Force on Preventive Health Care 2014). Therefore, any impact on the labor market outcomes
of prostate cancer patients is likely to have been caused by improvements in treatment and
diagnostics and not by changing attitudes towards screening.
For both types of cancer, treatment options include surgery (mastectomy and prostatec-
tomy), radiotherapy, chemotherapy, and hormone therapy (antiestrogen therapy for breast
cancer and androgen deprivation therapy for prostate cancer).5 Increasingly, a combination
of two or more options is used (see below). In the case of prostate cancer, an alternative
to immediate treatment is watchful waiting. This course of action may especially be used






age range that we consider (49–60), however, it is more common to treat prostate cancer
using one or several of the options above. For example, Bechis, Carroll, and Cooperberg
(2011) find that 85 percent of prostate cancer patients under the age of 55 were treated with
a radical prostatectomy.
3.2 Measuring Innovation in Cancer Treatment
Treatment options for many types of cancer have vastly improved over the past few decades
(see, e.g., Sudhakar 2009). The combination of surgery and chemotherapy or radiation
therapy is one of the major innovations that have lowered cancer mortality rates. Medical
innovation has made cancer treatments more effective and reduced their side effects. Zurrida
and Veronesi (2015) describe important treatment innovations that happened during our
sample period, such as breast-conserving surgery in the 1990s. Chemotherapy has become
more effective at targeting cancer cells while causing less harm to healthy cells (for example,
by using the drug tamoxifen starting in the 1980s). New drugs that lower the risk of side
effects of chemotherapy have also been developed (DeVita and Chu 2008). The majority of
new drugs, however, are approved for advanced-stage cancers and not for first-line therapy
(Tibau et al. 2018).
More recent pharmaceutical innovations in breast cancer treatment may be highly effective
but they are also more expensive than older drugs. For example, Durkee et al. (2016) find that
adding pertuzumab to a treatment of metastatic breast cancer with docetaxel and trastuzumab
leads to an average cost increase of almost US$300,000. Therefore, it is particularly important
to evaluate the economic benefits that these treatment innovations may yield.
Denmeade and Isaacs (2002) describe the history of prostate cancer treatment that
includes the use of hormonal therapy such as luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone analogues
(triptorelin) since the early 1980s. More recent drugs such as degarelix provide improved
and cost-effective treatment options (Hatoum et al. 2013). Several innovations in surgical
methods have also provided additional treatment options for prostate cancer. For example,
laparoscopic radical prostatectomy is a minimally invasive surgical technique that leads to
better postoperative functional outcomes (Lipke and Sundaram 2005).
These improvements in treatment of breast and prostate cancer are also reflected in the
innovation measures that we use in our empirical analyses below. Due to the significance of
chemotherapy and, especially in the case of prostate cancer, hormone therapy in treating
these cancers, drugs that are available for treatment of a specific type of cancer are an
important measure of medical innovation. Lichtenberg (2015) provides a list of all drugs that
are available for treatment by cancer type along with the year when they were approved
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in Canada.6 We use this information to calculate the cumulative number of drugs that
were available for the treatment of breast and prostate cancer in the year of an individual’s
diagnosis.
To account for the delay between the approval of a drug and its widespread use in
treatment, we consider lags of 5 and 10 years. Lichtenberg (2015) finds that lags of 10 and
more years yield statistically significant results when regressing years of potential life lost
on the cumulative number of drugs in Canada. Using data from 36 countries, Lichtenberg
(2018b) also estimates a negative relationship between the number of drugs launched at least
five years earlier and cancer-related mortality. Using a five-year lag, Figure 1 shows that the
number of prostate cancer drugs increased from 14 to 27 and the number of breast cancer
drugs rose from 17 to 39 between 1992 and 2010.
Pharmaceutical innovation is an important driver for improved treatment of breast and
prostate cancer, but there are additional medical innovations that are not captured by the
number of available drugs. To capture the improved diagnostics, radiation, and surgical
procedures that have also contributed to better treatment of these cancers, our second
innovation measure is based on the Cancer Moonshot Patent Data from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO).7 We identify patents that are relevant for breast and prostate
cancer by searching for the key words prostate or prostatic and breast or mammary. Our
list includes diagnostic procedures, surgical equipment and methods, and pharmaceutical
innovation. We include not only patents that were granted but also those that were rejected
to capture the full range of cancer-related inventions.
Not every invention contributes to medical innovation equally. To account for a patent’s
importance, we construct a quality index as proposed by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
Specifically, we estimate the common factor qj that we interpret as the quality of patent j in
yjk = µk + λkqj + jk,
where yjk is the kth characteristic of patient j. As suggested by Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2004) and Squicciarini, Dernis, and Criscuolo (2013), we use scope (the number of Interna-
tional Patent Classification subclasses the invention is allocated to), claims (the number of
specific aspects of technology), backward citations (the number of patents that are being
6Approval of these drugs goes back to 1950, so the list includes all drugs that are relevant for cancer
treatment.
7See https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/cancer-moonshot-patent-
data. The USPTO specifically assembled this data set to summarize the state of cancer-related innovation. It
includes patents for drugs, diagnostics, surgical devices, data analytics, and genomic-based inventions. While
these patents were granted in the United States, the corresponding inventions were also available in Canada
even if no patent was granted there.
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cited), and forward citations (the number of times a patent has been cited).8 A higher value in
these four measures tends to be associated with a higher quality or more important invention.
To account for truncation, we apply the adjustment factor developed by Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2005) to forward citations. For each characteristic yjk, we normalize the measure
by its year-specific maximum as in Squicciarini, Dernis, and Criscuolo (2013). Finally, we
sum up the estimated quality factors qj by year and cumulate them over years separately
for prostate and breast cancer. Figure 1 shows that the growth in the quality-adjusted
patent index was slightly faster for prostate cancer–related innovations after 2000. Since
2005, however, innovation as measured by the cumulative patent index has slowed for both
cancer types.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
The individual-level data come from three sources: the 1991 Canadian Census, the Canadian
Cancer Database (CCDB) and Mortality Database (CMDB), and tax return data (including
the Longitudinal Worker File [LWF] and the T1 Family File [T1FF]).9 The 1991 Canadian
Census Cohort derived from these data sources consists of individuals who were aged 25 and
older in the 1991 census and who were linked to the CCDB and CMDB. The CCDB and
CMDB data provide cancer diagnoses up to 2010 and death records up to 2011.10 Specifically,
the CCDB contains the year of the diagnosis and the site of the cancer.11 In addition, all
individuals aged 25 and older in the 1991 census were linked to LWF and T1FF tax records
from 1989 to 2015 irrespective of whether they appeared in the CCDB or CMDB. Hence, we
have access to a representative sample of the Canadian population including individuals who
were diagnosed with breast or prostate cancer between 1992 and 2010.12
To construct the estimation sample, we first restrict the age range of individuals diagnosed
with cancer for the first time. We select men aged 49–60 for our prostate cancer sample
and women aged 35–60 for our breast cancer sample. (In our main results, we focus on the
subsample of women diagnosed with breast cancer at the age of 35–44). The lower threshold
is justified by a very small number of individuals diagnosed at younger ages. The upper
8Data on scope, claims, and citations stem from the NBER Patent Data Project and are available at
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001).
9We have used and described these data sources in Jeon (2017) and Jeon and Pohl (2017). The Online
Appendix to Jeon and Pohl (2017) and Peters et al. (2013) also provide a detailed description. In contrast to
our earlier studies, here we use a larger sample over a longer sample period.
10In our robustness analysis based on five-year survivors, we use individual death information from both
CCMD and tax data, which include death information up to 2015.
11While the CCDB also contains a variable indicating the stage of the cancer at the time of the diagnosis,
this variable is unusable in practice due to nonrandom missing values.
12We drop individuals who were diagnosed with other types of cancer from our samples.
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threshold limits the role of early retirement during the follow-up period after the cancer
diagnosis. To reduce the influence of outliers, we drop individuals whose annual earnings fall
into the top and bottom 0.05 percent of the earnings distribution.13 Our restricted samples
consist of 734,188 men and 915,880 women (626,801 in the 35–44 age group). Among these
individuals, 7,908 men were diagnosed with prostate cancer and 19,163 women were diagnosed
with breast cancer during the 1992–2010 sample period (3,436 in the 35–44 age group).
We then construct the treatment and control groups as follows: For each year from
s = 1992 to s = 2010, we assign individuals who were diagnosed with breast or prostate
cancer for the first time in year s to the treatment group. We then assign individuals who
were not diagnosed with cancer to the control group for year s if their earnings for years s− 1
and s− 2 are observed.14 The control group in our sample initially includes many duplicate
individuals as the same individuals can be controls in multiple s; however, as described in
Section 5 below, the final control group contains fewer duplicate individuals after matching.
Tables 1–3 in the online appendix display summary statistics for the prostate and breast
cancer samples, including the sample fractions for treated and control group members and the
normalized differences between them.15 Most characteristics are sufficiently balanced between
treatment and control group even before matching—that is, their normalized differences are
below the rule of thumb value of 0.25 (Imbens and Rubin 2015). The two main exceptions
are age and number of children. Since the likelihood of a cancer diagnosis increases with age,
the control group is younger, particularly in the prostate cancer sample. In addition, older
individuals are less likely to list dependent children on their tax return, so fewer controls are
classified as having no children. In the breast cancer sample, the difference in the fraction of
women without children may partially stem from the fact that childlessness increases the risk
of breast cancer (Kampert, Whittemore, and Paffenbarger 1988). Other variables that may
affect labor market outcomes after the cancer diagnosis—such as education, prediagnosis
employment status, and earnings—are relatively balanced. In Section 5 below, we discuss the
matching algorithm that ensures a balanced estimation sample.
13The lower cutoff is −$41,156 for men and −$20,039 for women, and the upper cutoff is $1,379,726 for
men and $422,089 for women. The dollar amounts are in 2010 Canadian dollars.
14This includes zero earnings for those who did not work in each year.






, where X¯j is the sample mean for the
control or treatment group and σ2j is the sample variance.
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5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Coarsened Exact Matching
To balance covariates across cancer patients and the control group, we use coarsened exact
matching (CEM). Iacus et al. (2011; 2012) propose this matching algorithm that splits the
sample into strata based on coarsened observed variables and matches treatment and control







C ×NC/NT if i in control group
1 if i in treated group
(1)
for stratum k, where nkT and nkC are the number of individuals in the treatment and control
group in the stratum, and NT and NC are the numbers of observations in the entire sample.
Individuals who cannot be matched receive a weight of 0. Using CEM weights yields estimates
of the average treatment effect on the treated.
We use the following variables to calculate CEM weights: age (coarsened into 4 groups
for the prostate cancer sample and into 7 groups for the breast cancer sample), highest level
of schooling (4 categories), minority status (3 categories), province or territory of residence
in the year of the (placebo) diagnosis (12 categories), working/not working in the two years
before the diagnosis, earnings quintiles in the two years before the diagnosis (with a separate
category for not working), and year of the (placebo) diagnosis. In addition, we use the number
of children (coarsened into 4 groups) for the breast cancer sample.16 Including the year of
the (placebo) diagnosis in the set of matching variables allows us to assign a diagnosis-year
variable to members of the control group.
Columns (4) and (5) in Tables 1–3 in the online appendix display the means of individual
characteristics weighted by CEM weights. For variables that are used in the CEM algorithm,
the means are identical by construction, but even for other variables, such as union membership,
the normalized differences in column (6) of each table are substantially smaller than the raw
differences. Hence, the matching algorithm ensures that the treatment and control groups are
balanced across a wide range of individual characteristics. We are able to match 7,835 (99.1
percent) of the treated individuals in the prostate cancer sample and 18,844 (98.3 percent) in
the breast cancer sample. Among controls, we match far fewer individuals, but this is not an
issue as we sample the same individuals multiple times as explained in Section 4 above.
After applying the matching algorithm, we construct an annual panel for each treated and
16See the individual characteristics in Tables 1–3 in the online appendix for a complete list of the variables
and how they are coarsened.
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control observation, using up to five years before and after the (placebo) diagnosis. Hence,
we observe each individual in the sample for up to 11 years. We observe 91.5 percent of the
men in the prostate cancer sample and 88 percent of the women in the breast cancer sample
for the full period of 11 years. To address potential sample attrition, we conduct robustness
checks that only include members of the treated and control group who survive at least five
years after the diagnosis.
5.2 Labor Market Outcome Regressions
We model the labor market outcome Yits (employment status or the logarithm of annual
earnings) of individual i in year t.17 The year of the cancer diagnosis is denoted by s. The
estimation sample includes annual observations for up to t = s − 5, . . . , s + 5. Cis is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if i was diagnosed in year s = 1992, . . . , 2010 and 0 otherwise.
That is, Cis = 0 for all s for the matched controls. We also refer to year s as the placebo
diagnosis year for the control group. To obtain the average effect of a cancer diagnosis on
labor market outcomes, we run the following difference-in-differences regression:
Yits = δ1Pts + δ2CisPts + αi + γt + uits, (2)
where αi is an individual fixed effect, γt is a year fixed effect, and uits is an independent and
identically distributed error term. Pts = 1{t ≥ s} is a postdiagnosis indicator variable. In
this model, δ2 is the time-invariant average treatment effect on the treated. All regressions
are weighted by the CEM weights given in Equation (1). Standard errors in all regressions
are clustered at the unique individual level.
To estimate how medical innovations impact the labor market outcomes of cancer patients,
we first restrict the effects of a cancer diagnosis and of treatment innovation to be constant
over time:
Yits = β1Pts + β2Is−τ + β3CisPts + β4PtsIs−τ + β5CisPtsIs−τ + αi + γt + uits, (3)
where Is−τ denotes one of the lagged innovation measures described in Section 3.2 τ years
before an individual’s cancer diagnosis. We consider 5-year lags in our main results and
10-year lags in robustness checks. The effect of a cancer diagnosis, β3, and of available lagged
medical innovations, β5, do not vary over time in this specification.
It is possible that changes in labor market outcomes after a cancer diagnosis are not
17Note that observations for several i in the estimation sample may correspond to the same unique
individual in the raw data.
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constant over time. For example, a cancer patient may stop working immediately after the
diagnosis and during treatment but increase her labor supply gradually during the following
years. In addition, the effect of medical innovation may affect labor market outcomes
differentially over time. To account for these dynamic effects, we estimate a version of























where T jts = 1{t = s+j} is an indicator that equals 1 if j years have elapsed since the diagnosis.
We take the year before the diagnosis as the base year by setting β−1p = 0, p = 1, 3, 4, 5.
Including the prediagnosis interactions between treatment, period dummies, and the medical
innovation measures also allows us to assess the parallel trends assumption that is required
for difference-in-differences regressions. That is, we can test if the βj3s and βj5s equal 0 for
j ≤ −1.
The coefficients of interest in the regression in Equation (4) are the βj5s. They measure
the effect of increasing innovation by one unit on the difference between the average labor
market outcomes of cancer patients and controls j years after the diagnosis. The βj5s may not
be individually statistically significant, but that would not necessarily imply that medical
innovations have no effect on labor market outcomes of cancer patients. To determine if
medical innovation leads to changing labor market outcomes after a cancer diagnosis, we test
the following joint null hypothesis:
H0 : βj5 = 0, for all j = 0, . . . , 5. (5)
Rejecting this null hypothesis suggests that improved cancer treatment affects labor market
outcomes of cancer patients overall even if the time-varying triple interaction coefficients may
not be individually statistically significant. The results in Section 6 below contain p-values for
the F -test of hypothesis in Equation (5) that show whether the hypothesis can be rejected.
To ease the interpretation of the estimated effects, we calculate the overall effect of a
cancer diagnosis conditional on a specific value of the innovation measure. In particular, we
calculate this effect at the lowest and highest level of innovation during our sample period
βj3 + βj5Imin and βj3 + βj5Imax. (6)
Below, we present these combined effects across years before and after the diagnosis, j, along
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with their 95 percent confidence intervals that are calculated using the Delta method.
6 Results
6.1 The Effect of Medical Innovation on Labor Market Outcomes
6.1.1 Prostate Cancer
Column (1) of Table 1 shows that men’s probability of working declines by 1.8 percentage
points during the five years after a prostate cancer diagnosis unconditional on medical
innovation.18 This estimate is consistent with the results in Bradley et al. (2007).
Innovation, measured as the number of approved drugs and the patent index five years
before the cancer diagnosis, increases the likelihood of being employed among cancer patients
during the five years after the year of diagnosis. These coefficients are statistically significant
at the 5 percent level in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1. These estimates imply a change
in the overall employment effect of a prostate cancer diagnosis from −0.0390 (= −0.0680 +
14 × 0.00208) in 1992 to −0.0118 (= −0.0680 + 27 × 0.00208) in 2010—that is, a decline
of 70 percent, as the number of approved drugs increased from 14 to 27. For patents, the
estimated coefficients in column (3) imply a decline in the negative employment effect from
−0.0327 (= −0.0332 + 1.605× 0.000329) to −0.0117 (= −0.0332 + 65.350× 0.000329), or 64
percent. Hence, we find evidence that medical innovation in the treatment of prostate cancer
is associated with alleviating the negative effects of prostate cancer at the extensive margin
of labor supply.
Next, we run the same regressions with log-annual earnings as the outcome variable (i.e.,
we consider effects at the intensive margin of labor supply). Unconditional on treatment
innovation, we find a decline in annual earning of about 12 percent among employed prostate
cancer patients in column (1) of Table 2. This estimate suggests that some prostate cancer
patients reduce their hours of work, although we cannot rule out the possibility that their
wages declined as our data contain neither hours of work nor wage rates.
The estimates in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 show that medical innovation reduces the
negative effect of a prostate cancer diagnosis on earnings, with the triple interaction terms
being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These estimates imply that the increase
in approved drugs is associated with a reduction in the earnings decline from approximately
19 percent to 9 percent and the patent index with a change from 17 percent to 10 percent
between 1992 and 2010. While these effects are not very precisely estimated, they suggest
18We only display the estimated coefficients δˆ2, βˆ3, and βˆ5 from regressions in Equations (2) and (3) in
the regression tables. Complete results are available upon request.
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that medical innovation also lowers the negative labor market effects of a prostate cancer
diagnosis at the intensive margin.
We now consider the dynamic specification in Equation (4). Figure 2 shows the overall
effect of a prostate cancer diagnosis on employment and log-earnings at the highest and
lowest level of innovation given by Equation (6).19 The pattern is similar for both innovation
measures. We find that the effect of a cancer diagnosis on employment status is statistically
indistinguishable from 0 in the year of the diagnosis irrespective of the level of innovation,
but, at the minimum level of innovation, it drops to about −5 percentage points within
three years and remains there. In contrast, the medium- to long-run effects at the highest
level of innovation are not statistically significantly different from 0 (see panels [a] and[b]).
The p-values for the test of null hypothesis in Equation (5) equal 0.0552 and 0.0761 in the
regressions using drugs and patents. Similarly, the negative earnings effect is stable over
time and more than twice as large at the lowest level of innovation (see panels [c] and [d]).
The corresponding p-values equal 0.0487 and 0.0695. Finally, Figure 2 supports the parallel
trends assumption as the confidence intervals for the treatment effects in the prediagnosis
period include 0.
6.1.2 Breast Cancer
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the probability of working declined by 3.9 percentage
points following a breast cancer diagnosis among women aged 35–60. This estimate is smaller
than the one reported in previous studies, but Bradley et al. (2002a; 2002b; 2005) use an
older sample (average age 55 versus 50 in our sample). Columns (2) to (4) indicate that
medical innovation has no significant effect on the likelihood of employment for breast cancer
patients.
As medical innovation does not have any measurable economic benefits in the full sample,
we focus on the 35–44 age group. These women constitute only about 18 percent of the
treatment group, but they are likely to be most responsive to improved treatment options for
breast cancer for two reasons. First, they are more strongly attached to the labor force, so
they are more likely to take advantage of innovative treatment options to remain working.
Second, breast cancer diagnoses are often more severe among younger women, and recent
innovations have particularly improved treatment for these advanced-stage types of breast
cancer (see Section 3). Table 4 presents the regression results for this subsample. The results
in column (1) show that a breast cancer diagnosis lowered the probability of working by 3.3
percentage points.
19The full regression results are available upon request.
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Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 show that medical innovation has a positive and statistically
significant effect on employment. Calculating the overall effect of a breast cancer diagnosis
on employment evaluated at the lowest and highest levels of innovation, we find that the
effect decreased (in absolute value) from −0.047 to −0.015 as the lagged number of approved
breast cancer drugs increased from 17 in 1992 to 39 in 2010. Evaluated at the minimum and
maximum patent index, the employment effect changed from −0.049 to −0.018. Medical
innovation is therefore associated with a 63–68 percent decline in the negative employment
effect of a breast cancer diagnosis over the 1992 to 2010 time period.
Next, we consider annual log-earnings as the outcome variable in Table 5. Conditional
on being employed, a breast cancer diagnosis leads to a substantial decline in earnings of
29 percent (= exp(−0.336) − 1) in column (1). In contrast to the results in our prostate
cancer sample, we find that medical innovation is associated with an increase in the negative
earnings effects of a breast cancer diagnosis as indicated by negative coefficients on the triple
interaction terms in columns (2) and (3). They are statistically significant at the 10 level
and suggest that the earnings decline due to a breast cancer diagnosis increased from −24
percent to −33 percent when using number of approved drugs and when using the patent
index as the measure of medical innovation.
Taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that innovation in breast cancer
treatment allowed some women affected by this disease to stay employed. At the same time,
the women who remained employed most likely reduced the number of hours they worked
because new treatments required more time for recovery from a physically demanding therapy,
compelling women to reduce their labor supply at the intensive margin.
Finally, we consider dynamic treatment effects in the breast cancer sample for women
aged 35–44, shown in Figure 3. Panels (a) and (b) indicate that the negative effect of a
breast cancer diagnosis on employment increases over time at the lowest level of innovation,
reaching about −6 percentage points after four years. At the highest level of innovation, the
employment effect is similar until the first year after the diagnosis, becoming less negative
and statistically indistinguishable from 0 in later years. The p-values for the test of null
hypothesis in Equation (5) equal 0.0184 and 0.0598 for drugs and patents, pointing to a
significant overall effect of medical innovation.
Turning to log-earnings in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3, we find that the increase in the
negative earnings effect associated with medical innovation is driven by the first year after
the diagnosis when breast cancer patients are most likely to undergo treatment. In later
years, the earnings effects are larger in absolute value at the highest innovation level, but
the difference to the effect at the lowest innovation level is not statistically significant. The
postdiagnosis effects of medical innovation are jointly marginally significant with p-values of
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0.0791 and 0.0633 for drugs and patents.
Based on the estimated employment effects in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3, there is
a slight pre-trend at the lowest innovation level, but except for the effect five years before
the diagnosis, the confidence intervals include 0. At the highest innovation level and for the
earnings effects in panels (c) and (d), the parallel trends assumption is satisfied.
6.2 The Role of Education
To investigate how cancer patients’ educational attainment affects the relationship among a
cancer diagnosis, medical innovation, and labor market outcomes, we estimate the regressions
in Equations (2) and (3) separately for individuals without a high school degree, with a
high school degree but no postsecondary education, and with at least some postsecondary
education.
For our prostate cancer sample, columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 show an educational gradient
in the effects of prostate cancer on employment. Employment of patients without a high
school degree declines by 2.7, those with a high school degree but no postsecondary education
by 1.8, and those with postsecondary education by 1.2 percentage points. Heinesen and
Kolodziejczyk (2013) find a similar educational gradient in the negative effects on employment
among Danish colorectal and breast cancer patients.
Next, we investigate how the mitigating effect of medical innovation on the negative
employment effects of a prostate cancer diagnosis varies with education.20 For drugs in
columns (4) to (6) of Table 6 and the patent index in columns (7) to (9), we find that
the effect of medical innovation is largest and most statistically significant for men with
postsecondary education. For patients with less education, innovation has no statistically
significant effect. (The effect of the patent index for high school graduates is the only
exception.)
Table 7 shows the regression results for our breast cancer sample. First, we find an
educational gradient similar to the one observed for prostate cancer patients. The employment
of patients without a high school degree declined by 4.6 percentage points, high school
graduates by 4.2 percentage points, and patients with postsecondary education by 1.7
percentage points as seen in columns (1) to (3).
Finally, we consider the relationship among medical innovation, education, and the
employment of breast cancer patients. As in the prostate cancer sample, the effect of medical
innovation is strongest among women with postsecondary education. This finding applies to
20As the effects of medical innovation in the earnings regressions reveal less significant effects of medical
innovation, we only consider employment status as an outcome here. Earnings regressions by educational
attainment are available upon request.
18
approved drugs and patents as measures of innovation; see columns (4) to (9) of Table 7. In
both cases, the coefficient on the triple interaction term is highly statistically significant in
the highest education subsample, while it is not—or only marginally—significant for women
with a high school degree or less.
Overall, we find that individuals with less than postsecondary education do not seem to
benefit from improved treatment options in terms of employment. Our data do not allow us
to investigate the mechanisms that explain why, but several pathways are plausible. First,
different medical providers may offer different treatments, and identifying and receiving
treatment from providers who offer up-to-date treatments may be more costly for individuals
with less education.
Second, Lange (2011) shows that highly educated individuals are more likely to adopt
cancer screenings because they better understand scientific evidence. This finding has two
implications for the present context. Highly educated cancer patients may also better
understand the benefits of the new treatments and insist that their physician prescribe
them. In the same vein, Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg (2005) find that the more educated
use more recently approved drugs. In addition, Lange’s (2011) finding implies that cancer
diagnoses among individuals with low education may be more severe because these individuals
are diagnosed at a more advanced stage. We cannot test this hypothesis because of data
limitations, but the medical innovation that took place in the 1990s and 2000s mostly
improved the treatment of more severe types of cancer, so, if anything, less educated patients
should benefit more from innovation. Finding that they do not points to unequal access to
new and more effective forms of treatments.
Another possible explanation is related to treatment adherence. Innovative cancer treat-
ments are often more complex than older ones; for example, new treatments combine
chemotherapy with radiation treatments (see Section 3). Cancer patients with low education
may receive the same treatment plans, but they may be less likely to comply with a full
treatment regimen. As a result, the protective effects of medical innovation in terms of
reduced negative labor market effects may not materialize for these individuals.
Finally, it is possible that cancer patients with low education work in physically more
demanding jobs where it is more difficult to undergo a modern high-intensity cancer treatment
while remaining employed. Since our data include neither information on medical providers,




Due to space constraints, we report the regression results for our robustness checks in the
online appendix. We conduct two sets of checks. First, we reestimate all regressions presented
in the paper using 10-year lags for the innovation measures. As Figures 1 and 2 and Tables
4–10 in the appendix show, the results are largely unchanged with the exception of the
earnings effects of innovation losing their statistical significance in the breast cancer sample.
Second, we reestimate all regressions on samples of individuals who survive at least five years
after the (placebo) diagnosis to investigate whether our results are sensitive to attrition. In
the prostate cancer sample, the estimated coefficients are similar to our main results. For
breast cancer, however, the employment effect of a diagnosis becomes smaller in the 35–44
age group, and the effects of innovation become insignificant. This difference is due to the
fact that women who survive their breast cancer diagnosis by five years have a less severe
form of cancer and therefore reduce their labor supply by less and also benefit less from
medical innovation. The educational gradient persists in this sample, although the difference
is not as significant. (See Figures 3 and 4 and Tables 11–17 in the online appendix.)
7 Conclusion
This paper is the first to assess the labor market effects of innovations in cancer treatment.
We use large representative samples of Canadian breast and prostate cancer patients along
with control groups and measure medical innovation by the number of approved drugs and a
quality-adjusted patent index. We find that medical innovation is associated with a reduction
in the decline in labor supply at the extensive margin following a prostate or breast cancer
diagnosis and at the intensive margin in the case of prostate cancer. We also show that only
cancer patients with postsecondary education appear to benefit from medical innovation.
While our results point to an important role of medical innovation in improving the labor
market outcomes of cancer patients, we cannot be certain that these effects are causal. A
comparison across different types of cancer would allow us to exploit variation in innovation
measures over time and across cancer sites, but we would not have sufficient power when
restricting the sample to working-age individuals. In addition, due to the lack of information
on cancer stage at the time of diagnosis, we cannot separate the effects of innovations in
treatment options from improvements in diagnostics. Our patent index includes both types
of innovations, however, and our results indicate that medical innovation overall (related to
treatment and diagnosis) mitigates employment effects. Finally, we do not observe actual
treatments, so our results should be interpreted as intent-to-treat effects.
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Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the economic value of medical innovation as
measured by the labor market effects among cancer patients is high. The economic benefits
that we find are in addition to the reduced mortality due to improved cancer treatment
and imply that innovative and expensive cancer treatment may be more cost-effective than
previously thought. Future research should disentangle these benefits further to show if any
specific innovations account for particularly large changes in labor market outcomes.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 1: Innovation Measures by Cancer Site and Over Time
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(a) Employment—Innovation Measure: Number of
Drugs
(b) Employment—Innovation Measure: Patent In-
dex
(c) Annual Log-Earnings—Innovation Measure:
Number of Drugs
(d) Annual Log-Earnings—Innovation Measure:
Patent Index






5Imax for j = −5, . . . , 5, i.e., the effect
of a prostate cancer diagnosis on labor market outcomes at the lowest and highest level of medical innovation,
along with their 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
Figure 2: Dynamic Treatment Effects of Prostate Cancer Diagnosis on Labor Market Out-
comes, Aged 49–60, by Level of Innovation (Five-Year Lag)
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(a) Employment—Innovation Measure: Number of
Drugs
(b) Employment—Innovation Measure: Patent In-
dex
(c) Annual Log-Earnings—Innovation Measure:
Number of Drugs
(d) Annual Log-Earnings—Innovation Measure:
Patent Index






5Imax for j = −5, . . . , 5, i.e., the effect
of a breast cancer diagnosis on labor market outcomes at the lowest and highest level of medical innovation,
along with their 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3: Dynamic Treatment Effects of Breast Cancer Diagnosis on Labor Market Outcomes,
Aged 35–44, by Level of Innovation (Five-Year Lag)
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Table 1: Prostate Cancer Employment Regressions with Time-Invariant Effects, Aged 49–60
Diff-in-Diff Triple-Difference
(1) (2) (3)






Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.0665 0.0670 0.0668
Number of unique persons 535,723 535,723 535,723
Person-year observations 19,743,677 19,743,677 19,743,677
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered on the unique person level) from regressions with time-invariant
effects. The dependent variable is an indicator for annual employment status that equals one if the person had non-zero
earnings in a given year. Post is a dummy variable that equals one after the (placebo) cancer diagnosis, Cancer is a cancer
diagnosis indicator, and Drugs and Patents are the amount of approved drugs and the cumulative patent index in the year
of the diagnosis, lagged by 5 years (see regression (3) in the text). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
Table 2: Prostate Cancer Log-Earnings Regressions with Time-Invariant Effects, Aged 49–60
Diff-in-Diff Triple-Difference
(1) (2) (3)






Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.0708 0.0710 0.0710
Number of unique persons 521,311 521,311 521,311
Person-year observations 17,500,524 17,500,524 17,500,524
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered on the unique person level) from regressions with time-invariant
effects. The dependent variable is annual log-earnings. Post is a dummy variable that equals one after the (placebo) cancer
diagnosis, Cancer is a cancer diagnosis indicator, and Drugs and Patents are the amount of approved drugs and the
cumulative patent index in the year of the diagnosis, lagged by 5 years (see regression (3) in the text). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
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Table 3: Breast Cancer Employment Regressions with Time-Invariant Effects, Aged 35–60
Diff-in-Diff Triple-Difference
(1) (2) (3)






Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.0286 0.0288 0.0288
Number of unique persons 721,377 721,377 721,377
Person-year observations 37,451,015 37,451,015 37,451,015
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered on the unique person level) from regressions with time-invariant
effects. The dependent variable is an indicator for annual employment status that equals one if the person had non-zero
earnings in a given year. Post is a dummy variable that equals one after the (placebo) cancer diagnosis, Cancer is a cancer
diagnosis indicator, and Drugs and Patents are the amount of approved drugs and the cumulative patent index in the year
of the diagnosis, lagged by 5 years (see regression (3) in the text). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
Table 4: Breast Cancer Employment Regressions with Time-Invariant Effects, Aged 35–44
Diff-in-Diff Triple-Difference
(1) (2) (3)






Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.00862 0.00864 0.00864
Number of unique persons 381,871 381,871 381,871
Person-year observations 10,512,459 10,512,459 10,512,459
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered on the unique person level) from regressions with time-invariant
effects. The dependent variable is an indicator for annual employment status that equals one if the person had non-zero
earnings in a given year. Post is a dummy variable that equals one after the (placebo) cancer diagnosis, Cancer is a cancer
diagnosis indicator, and Drugs and Patents are the amount of approved drugs and the cumulative patent index in the year
of the diagnosis, lagged by 5 years (see regression (3) in the text). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
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Table 5: Breast Cancer Log-Earnings Regressions with Time-Invariant Effects, Aged 35–44
Diff-in-Diff Triple-Difference
(1) (2) (3)






Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.0112 0.0112 0.0112
Number of unique persons 374,865 374,865 374,865
Person-year observations 9,374,112 9,374,112 9,374,112
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered on the unique person level) from regressions with time-invariant
effects. The dependent variable is annual log-earnings. Post is a dummy variable that equals one after the (placebo) cancer
diagnosis, Cancer is a cancer diagnosis indicator, and Drugs and Patents are the amount of approved drugs and the
cumulative patent index in the year of the diagnosis, lagged by 5 years (see regression (3) in the text). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
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